In the relations ontology we express:
eukaryotes consists of nucleus ==> consists_of(eukaryotes, nucleus)
eurkaryotic cell enveloped by cell membrane ==> enveloped_by(cell, cell membrane)
as I am representing the school textbook, I find a few sentences to be of the form of negation. These are:
prokaryotes does not consist of nucleus ==> ~consists_of(prokaryotes, nucleus)
prokaryotes not enveloped by membrane ==> ~enveloped_by(prokaryotes, membrane)
Such negations are useful for students to understand the difference between eukaryotes and prokaryotes and cannot be avoided during representation.
so my query is: can we include the negations of relation names in the relations ontology. how can we represent such negation relation names.
since ~consists_of, ~enveloped_by are negation of consists_of, enveloped_by respectively, does the relation names ~consists_of, ~enveloped_by still fall under the meronymic inclusion and spatial inclusion respectively.
I think so. In the above assertions, we know in reality that prokaryotes donot consists of nucleus, but this is equally important for representation. In cases such as something may cease to exist at a particular time t then we still have to represent such assertions even though these would be in negation forms.
But the question that is grappling my mind is the following:
ontology is the representation of types. it represents what exists in reality. now something that does not exist in reality, and yet if we want to represent it then would we still be creating ontology of non-existent entities. and if yes, then would it still be ontology.
Perhaps, philosophers can provide a convincing argument for my question.